The Manchurian Incident Timeline
September 1931 - January 1932
  Thursday, September 10, 1931  
  Emperor Hirohito summoned Navy Minister Admiral Abo Kiyokazu to the Imperial Palace to question him about the state of military discipline. Hirohito was angry because he had heard that the Kwangtung Army’s young officers were out of control.  
  Friday, September 11, 1931  
Emperor Hirohito summoned War Minister General Minami Jiro to the Imperial Palace. Hirohito was angry because he had heard that the Kwangtung Army’s young officers were out of control. Hirohito warned Minami to restore order. Minami was prepared for the occasion. “When the Emperor was about to question the state of military discipline, the Minister of War proceeded that recently some of the young officers have been criticizing the weakness of foreign policy … The authorities recognize that foreign policy is national policy and do not approve of their statements or actions, and they intend to adopt careful supervision.” After meeting with the Emperor, Minami would call a meeting of the Imperial General Staff to discuss the situation in Manchuria. At that meeting it was decided to dispatch two letters from the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff General Kanaya Hanzo to the Kwangtung Army in Manchuria with warnings not to take action without consulting Tokyo.
  Thursday, September 17, 1931  
  At a special conference Army Minister General Minami Jiro and Army Chief of Staff Kanaya Hanzo agreed that General Honjo Shigeru, Commander in Chief of the Kwangtung Army, should be advised of Emperor Hirohito’s warning not to take action without consulting Tokyo. Deciding that communication by telegram could lead to misinterpretation Major General Tatekawa Yoshitsugu was dispatched from Tokyo to Mukden, Manchuria with letters two letters from the Minami and Kanaya. The purpose of Tatekawa’s visit to prevent an incident was relayed secretly to plotters in the Kwangtung Army by Tatekawa’s assistant Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro.  
  Friday, September 18, 1931  
  Lt. General Honjo Shigeru, Commander in Chief of the Kwangtung Army, was informed that the nature of Major General Tatekawa Yoshitsugu visit to Mukden was to warn them of Emperor Hirohito’s warning not to take action without consulting Tokyo. Honjo consulted with Colonel Itagaki Seishiro and Lt. Colonel Ishiwara Kanji and decided that the Mukden plot would proceed as scheduled for that night and that Tatekawa needed to be diverted. Itagaki was chosen to meet with Tatekawa and got on Tatekawa’s express train at Penhsisu. Tatekawa immediately warned Itagaki that Tokyo was worried about the recklessness of the Kwangtung Army’s young officers but said that he would wait until the following day for a meeting to discuss the matter. Tatekawa’s train arrived in Mukden at 1 p.m. and Tatekawa was persuaded to go to a inn to be entertained where he spent the evening with geishas, got intoxicated, and was asleep by 9 p.m.  
  The Mukden Incident, also known as the Manchurian Incident occurred. Following a plan devised by Kwantung Army Colonel Itagaki Seishiro and Lt. Colonel Ishiwara Kanji a section of railway owned by Japan's South Manchuria Railway was dynamited at 10:20 p.m. by the Japanese Independent Garrison Unit of the 29th Infantry Regiment. The explosion was minor and only a five-foot section on one side of the rail was damaged. In fact, a train from Changchun passed by the site on this damaged track without difficulty and arrived at Shenyang at 10:30 p.m. The Japanese immediately blamed the Chinese for the action and would follow up with military action early the next morning. This military action marked the beginning of an unofficial war between China and Japan, which undermined relations in the Far East.  
  At 10:30 p.m., Morito Morishima, chief assistant to Japanese Consul General Hayashi Hisajiro, received a telephone call from the Japanese Army’s Special Service Office in Mukden advising him that an explosion had occurred on the South Manchurian Railway and that he should report to the Special Service Headquarters in Mukden. He arrived at 10:45 and found Colonel Itagaki Seishiro and other officers there. Colonel Itagaki stated that the Chinese had exploded the railroad, that Japan must take appropriate military action, and that orders had been issued to that effect. Morishima tried to persuade Colonel Itagaki that they should rely upon peaceful negotiations to adjust the matter. Morishima was reprimanded by Colonel Itagaki and then threatened physically after which the meeting broke up.  
  At Dalian Lt. General Honjo received a telegraphic report at 11:46 p.m. giving details of the attack from the Special Services Station at Mukden. Honjo was at first appalled that the invasion plan was enacted without his permission, but was eventually convinced by Lt. Colonel Ishiwara to give his approval after the fact but for action in Mukden only. Orders were given to troops at Liaoyang, Yingkow, and Fenghuangsheng to proceed to Mukden. The fleet was ordered from Port Arthur to Yingkow.  
  The Japanese Consulate received many requests during the night and morning from the Supreme Advisor for Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang imploring the office of the Consul General to persuade the Japanese Army to cease attacks. All these messages were communicated to the military. Japanese Consul General in Mukden Hayashi Hisajiro talked over the telephone a number of times during the night of the 18th and morning of the 19th with Colonel Itagaki in an effort to persuade him to cease the fighting, but Colonel Itagaki remained defiant and consistently informed the Consul General that he should cease interference with the right of military command.  
  Saturday, September 19, 1931  
  Early in the morning two artillery pieces installed at the Mukden officers' club opened up on the Chinese garrison at the nearby Beidaying barracks, in response to the alleged Chinese attack on the railway. Marshal Zhang Xueliang's small air force was destroyed and the bombardment was followed by five hundred Japanese troops who attacked the Chinese garrison of around seven thousand. The Chinese troops, mostly irregulars or new conscripts, were no match for the experienced Japanese troops and fled. By early morning Japanese forces had occupied Mukden, including the arsenal and barracks and had seized a half dozen strategic points in the surrounding area.  
  A few minutes after midnight, a second telegram form the Special Service Office at Mukden was received at the Kwantung Army Headquarters. This message reported that the fighting had become more widespread and that the Chinese forces were bringing up reinforcements. The claims of this message were false as the Chinese forces were in full retreat.  
  Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army Lt. General Honjo Shigeru immediately issued orders bringing into action all Japanese forces in Manchuria. Orders were given to troops at Liaoyang, Yingkow, and Fenghuangsheng to proceed to Mukden. The Second Overseas Fleet was requested to sail from Port Arthur to Yingkow.  All the Japanese forces in Manchuria were brought into action almost simultaneously over the whole area of the South Manchuria Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur, a distance of approximately 400 miles. The Chinese troops at Antung, Yingkow, Liaoyang, and other smaller towns were overcome and disarmed without resistance.  
  Lt. General Honjo left Dalian with the Kwantung Army headquarters at 3:30 a.m. and arrived at Mukden at noon and set up a command post.  
  A message, purportedly from Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army Lt. General Honjo Shigeru, was received by Lt. General Hayashi Senjuro of the Chosen Army of Japan in Korea at 4 a.m. to send in reinforcements. Early in the morning a detachment of Japanese planes at Pyongyang departed for Mukden. Troops from the Twentieth Division at Seoul and Pyongyang were ordered to the Korea-Manchuria border and await further instructions. Lt. General Hayashi wired Tokyo requesting Imperial orders to move into Manchuria.  
  In the morning, Consul General Hayashi Hisajiro cabled Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro: "In view of the fact that it was proposed several times from the Chinese side that this matter be settled in a peaceful way, I phoned to Staff Officer Itagaki and said that since Japan and China had not yet formally entered into a state of war and that, moreover, as China had declared that she would act upon the non-resistance principle absolutely, it was necessary for us at this time to endeavor to prevent the aggravation fo the 'Incident' unnecessarily, and I urged that the matter be handled through diplomatic channels, but the above mentioned Staff Officer answered that since this matter concerned the prestige of the State and the Army, it was the Army's intention to see it through thoroughly."  
  At 10 a.m. Japanese Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro called a meeting of the cabinet to discuss the events in Manchuria. After the meeting Army Minister General Minami Jiro gave reporters a six paragraph statement which dodged what was happening.  
  The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a strong protest to the Japanese government and called for the immediate stop to Japanese military operations in Manchuria, and appealed to the League of Nations.  
  By the evening the fighting was over and the Japanese had occupied Mukden at the cost of five hundred Chinese lives and two Japanese lives.  
  Monday, September 21, 1931  
  At 10 a.m. an extraordinary meeting of the Japanese Cabinet was held at the private residence of Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro to decide whether the Kwangtung Army’s forces in Manchuria should be supplemented by troops from the Chosen Army of Japan in Korea. Army Minister General Minami Jiro explained in detail the military situation and the need for three to four thousand additional troops. He also stated that the Army chiefs had already made the decision to send the additional troops and didn’t need Cabinet approval. Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro and Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke voiced strong objections. Other members urged caution fearing that the incident would be interpreted abroad as a new expedition. The meeting ended at 5 p.m. without reaching a consensus.  
  Elements of the Chosen Army of Japan in Korea crossed the Yalu River into Manchuria while the Cabinet in Tokyo was meeting. Prime Minister Wakatsuki received information regarding this action at 5:30 p.m.  Wakatsuki expressed his displeasure of the action to Army Minister Minami who defended Lt. General Hayashi Senjuro’s decision by citing as precedence his similar action while he was commander of the Chosen Army during Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi tenure in 1929. Wakatsuki had to accept the army’s actions as a fait accompli.  
  China officially called for action by the League of Nations to maintain peace with Japan: ". . . beginning from ten o'clock of the night of September 18, regular troops of Japanese soldiers, without provocation of any kind, opened rifle and artillery fire upon Chinese soldiers at or near the city of Mukden, bombarded the arsenal and barracks of the Chinese soldiers, set fire to the ammunition depot, disarmed the Chinese troops in Changchun, Kwanchengtse, and other places, and later took military occupation of the, cities of Mukden and Antung and other places and of public buildings therein, and are now in such occupation. Lines of communication have also been seized by Japanese troops. . . . In view of the foregoing facts, the Republic of China, a member of the League of Nations, asserts that a situation has arisen which calls for action under the terms of Article 11 of the Covenant."  
  Japanese newspapers reported that sporadic fighting was going on in Manchuria. The press reported that only one soldier, Private Niikuni Rokuro of the special railway detachment, had been killed.  
  Tuesday, September 22, 1931  
  U.S. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson informed Japanese Ambassador Debuchi Katouji at Washington, D.C. that the responsibility for determining the course of events with regard to resolving the situation in Manchuria rested largely upon Japan, "for the simple reason that Japanese armed forces have seized and are exercising de-facto control in South Manchuria" and that the Manchurian coup raised questions of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact.  
  Wednesday, September 23, 1931  
  U.S. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson opposed a League Commission of Inquiry for the Manchurian incident. Japanese Ambassador Debuchi Katouji in Washington, D.C. had convinced him that any pressure would only weaken the civilians in the Japanese cabinet.  
  Stimson expressed sympathy with the League of Nations effort in the Manchurian matter. The League Council had sent minutes of its meeting and documents relating to the matter for the information of the United States in accordance with a resolution of September 22.  
  Thursday, September 24, 1931  
  The United States sent notes to China and Japan about the Mukden incident: "In view of the sincere desire of the people of this country that principles and methods of peace shall prevail in international relations, and of the existence of treaties, to several of which the United States is a party, the provisions of which are intended to regulate the adjustment of controversies between nations without resort to use of force, the American government feels warranted in expressing to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments its hope that they will cause their military forces to refrain from any further hostilities, will so dispose respectively of their armed forces as to satisfy the requirements of international law and international agreements, and will refrain from activities which may prejudice the attainment by amicable methods of an adjustment of their differences."  
  The Japanese Cabinet held an Extraordinary Meeting at 6 p.m. to deliberate on the situation in Manchuria. Speaking for the Army, War Minister Minami Jiro opposed any interference by the League of Nations or other power. The Cabinet agreed to instruct Mr. Yoshizawa in Shanghai to insist on direct negotiation with China. The Cabinet also passed a formal resolution at the Cabinet meeting denying that Japan had any territorial aims in Manchuria. After the meeting the Cabinet issued a long formal statement outlining the views of the Japanese government towards the Manchurian situation.  
  Friday, September 25, 1931  
  With the replies of both China and Japan having been received the League of Nations Council began deliberations on the Mukden Incident and the Manchurian situation.  
  Wednesday, September 30, 1931  
  The League of Nations Council adopted a resolution directed toward taking such interim measures as were deemed essential to prevent any aggravation of the situation growing out of the events involving Japanese aggression at Mukden on September 18-19. The resolution noted the stated Japanese intention of withdrawal of its troops as rapidly as possible and a Japanese disclaimer of territorial designs in Manchuria. These notations were included to put Japanese protestations on record. It was decided to meet again on October 14 to reassess the situation.  
  Thursday, October 1, 1931  
  China asked the League of Nations Council members to send observers to Manchuria to collect information on the Japanese evacuation and other relevant circumstances.  
  Monday, October 5, 1931  
  China asked for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Manchuria before the next League of Nations Council meeting on October 13.  
  U.S. Secretary Stimson instructed Prentiss Gilbert, the United States Consul at Geneva, to inform the Secretary General of the League of Nations that it was most desirable that the League in no way relax its vigilance and in no way fail to assert all its pressure and authority toward regulating the action of China and Japan. Secretary Stimson further stated that the U.S. Government, acting independently, would "endeavor to reinforce what the League does" and would make clear its keen interest in the matter and its awareness of the obligations of the disputants in the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty, "should a time arise when it would seem advisable to bring forward these obligations."  
  Thursday, October 8, 1931  
  The Japanese bombed Chinchow in Liaoning province. The Chinese appealed to the League of Nations about the continuing Japanese invasion.  
  Friday, October 9, 1931  
  Japan rejected Chinese request made on October 5 and asked for direct negotiations on fundamental points. Japan also protested the anti-Japanese movement in China saying that the boycott against Japanese goods was not spontaneous but an "instrument of national policy under direction of Nationalist Party, which, in view of peculiar political organization in China, is inseparable in function from government."  
  China asked for an immediate Council meeting in view of "serious information regarding further aggressive military operations upon the part of Japanese armed forces in Manchuria."  
  The United States urged the League of Nations "to assert all pressure and authority within its competence toward regulating the action of China and Japan," and said it was "acting independently through its diplomatic representatives will endeavor to reinforce what the League does …”  
  Saturday, October 10, 1931  
  The United States made oral representations to Japan and China urging a pacific policy and utmost restraint in keeping with the League resolution of September 30. Concern was expressed over the bombing of Chinchow by Japanese on October 8.  
  Sunday, October 11, 1931  
  U.S. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson protested to the Japanese about their actions in Manchuria. Stimson was disturbed that their commitments of the League resolution of September 30 were not being carried out. He also considered their explanation of the Chinchow bombing of October 8 was quite inadequate.  
  Thursday, October 15, 1931  
  Japan objected to the invitation to American representative to attend the League of Nations Council meetings on the Manchurian matter. Japan felt that under Article 17 only members of the League could sit with the Council on matters affecting their interests and that nonmembers could sit with the Council on matters in which they had a direct interest only under Art. 17. Japan felt that the inclusion of the United States as a signatory to the Kellogg Pact interested in the preservation of peace as a whole would invite the inclusion of other nations. Japan feared the political effect of a united front of opposition.  
  Friday, October 16, 1931  
  Aristide Briand of France ruled as president of the League of Nations Council to invite United States participation in the Council's Manchurian discussion: "to be associated with our efforts by sending a representative to sit at the Council table so as to be in a position to express an opinion as to how, either in view of the present situation or of its future development, effect can best be given to the provisions of the Pact." The Manchurian question concerned the fulfillment of obligations of the Pact of Paris and "Foremost among the signatories . . . appear the United States." This action was taken despite Japan’s vigorous objection to the admission of the U.S. to the Council’s deliberative body. Briand evaded Japan’s veto power by admitting the U.S. on a matter of procedure not substance.  
  U.S. Secretary of State Stimson directed Prentiss Gilbert, American consul at Geneva, to act as representative of the United States in the League Council. Gilbert would have full right of debate but since the U.S. was not a member of the League, he could not vote.  
  Saturday, October 17, 1931  
  Most of League of Nations Council members sent identic notes to China and Japan invoking the Kellogg Pact.  
  Tuesday, October 20, 1931  
  The United States invoked the Kellogg Pact because of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. This action was taken after Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain had done so. The U.S. State Department considered "A threat of war, wherever it may arise, is of profound concern , to the whole world . . ."  
  The United States Government sent identic notes to China and Japan calling attention to their obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The U.S. expressed the hope that nations would refrain from measures which might lead to war and that they would agree upon a peaceful method for resolving their dispute "in accordance with their promises and in keeping with expectations of public opinion throughout the world."  
  Saturday, October 24, 1931  
  The League of Nations Council invoked Article 10 of the Covenant, to apply to the Manchurian situation passed a resolution mandating the withdrawal of Japanese troops, to be completed by November 16. Its reasoning was because Japan would not accept a draft resolution setting a definite date for troop withdrawal and explain "the fundamental principles governing normal relations" which she wished to discuss with China previously. Japan rejected the League of Nations resolution and insisted on direct negotiations with the Chinese government.  
  Wednesday, November 4, 1931  
  A repair crew, guarded by 800 Japanese soldiers, began repairing the bridge over the Nonni River Bridge. The bridge had been dynamited earlier by Ma's forces during the fighting against the pro-Japanese collaborationist forces of General Chang Hai-Peng. The bridge was considered by important strategically and economically by the Japanese.  
  Hostilities broke out between the Japanese and 2,500 Chinese troops under General Ma Zhanshan who were nearby. Each side charged the other with opening fire without provocation.  
  A skirmish lasting three hours resulted with the Japanese advancing and droving General Ma's remaining troops off toward Qiqihar. 15 Japanese and 120 Chinese were reported killed.  
  Thursday, November 5, 1931  
  The Battle of the Nonni River Bridge continued as General Ma Zhanshan returned to counterattack the Japanese force at the Nonni River Bridge with a much larger force than he had the previous day. The Chinese dislodged the Japanese, under command of Major General Hasebe Shogo, from their advance positions.  
  U.S. Secretary of State Stimson sent note to Japan urging a peaceful solution of the Manchurian issue in the spirit of the League of Nations Council resolutions. Stimson "noted with regret and concern" Japan's desire to settle broader matters before troop withdrawal.  
  Friday, November 6, 1931  
  Japanese forces under command of Major General Hasebe Shogo successfully held their positions at the Nonni River Bridge. Following the Japanese victory General Ma Zhanshan retreated and fortified the town of Angangchi, just a few miles to the north, with 7,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and twenty artillery pieces. The repaired bridge made possible the further advance of Japanese forces and their armored trains. Despite his failure to hold the bridge, General Ma became a national hero in China for his resistance at the Nonni River Bridge, which was widely reported in the Chinese and international press. The publicity inspired more volunteers to enlist in the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Armies.  
  Wednesday, November 11, 1931  
  U.S. Secretary. of State Stimson asked General Charles G. Dawes, American Ambassador to Britain, to go to Paris during the League of Nations Council meeting. Stimson wrote "Inasmuch as this meeting will consider the present situation in Manchuria and questions may arise which will affect the interests or treaty obligations of the United States . . . he will be in a position to confer with the representatives of the other nations present in Paris in case such conference should seem desirable."  
  Thursday, November 12, 1931  
  The Japanese sent an ultimatum to General Ma Chan-shan to begin to withdraw from Tsitsihar in Heilongjiang province by November 15 and disperse his forces. General Ma was the leader of the Chinese forces that had fought the Japanese at the Nonni River Bridge from November 4 through November 6. General Ma had withdrawn his troops to Tsitsihar.  
  Thursday, November 19, 1931  
  General Ma Chan-shan led his troops to the east to defend Baiquan and Hailun. General Ma had evacuated Tsitsihar in Heilongjiang province. the previous day after being defeated by the Japanese south of the city on November 17.  
  Saturday, November 21, 1931  
  Japan proposed that the League of Nations send a commission of inquiry to Manchuria. Japan thought it would give a clear view of the "realities" in Manchuria and China and hoped the commission could be induced to approve the Japanese occupation.  
  Tuesday, November 24, 1931  
  Japan assured the United States there was nothing in to the report of a Japanese advance on Chinchow. The Japanese stated that "The Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of War, and the Chief of Staff were all of them agreed there should be no hostile operations toward Chinchow and that military orders to that effect had been issued."  
  Wednesday, November 25, 1931  
  China appealed for the establishment of a neutral zone between Japanese and Chinese forces. This action was taken because the Japanese were advancing on Chinchow.  
  U.S. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson approved the idea of a neutral commission for Manchuria in order to support the League of Nations Council action.  
  Thursday, November 26, 1931  
  The League of Nations Council notified China and Japan that Council members proposed to send observers to Chinchow area in order to establish a neutral zone.  
  Friday, November 27, 1931  
  Japan refused to accept the proposal of neutral observers to establish zone between Japanese and Chinese combatants in the Chinchow area. The Japanese stated that "The policy which the Japanese Government had so far consistently pursued in the true interest of good relations between China and Japan had been not to resort, in disputes capable of direct settlement with China, to the interposition of third parties."  
  Saturday, November 28, 1931  
  Japanese troops withdrew from the Chinchow area of Manchuria. Imperial Japanese Army commander in chief General Honjo Shigeru had dispatched 10,000 soldiers in 13 armored trains, escorted by a squadron of bombers, in an advance on Chinchow from Mukden. This force advanced to within 30 kilometers of Chinchow when it received the order to withdraw. The operation was cancelled by Japanese War Minister General Minami Jiro, due to the acceptance of modified form of a League of Nations proposal for a "neutral zone" to be established as a buffer zone between the Republic of China proper and Manchuria pending a future China-Japanese peace conference by the civilian government of Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro in Tokyo.  
  Thursday, December 10, 1931  
  The League of Nations Council adopted a resolution directed toward taking such interim measures as were deemed essential to prevent any aggravation of the situation growing out of the events involving Japanese aggression at Mukden on September 18-19. This resolution went beyond a resolution adopted on September 30 by expressing the desire of the Council “to contribute towards a final and fundamental solution by the two governments of the questions at issue between them.” The Council authorized a Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations to investigate the situation. The commission’s report would become known as the Lytton Report. The composition of the committee would be made on January 14, 1931. The committee would spend six weeks in Manchuria during the spring of 1932 and formally issue its report on October, 1 1932.  
    Learn more about the Lytton Report …  
  Sunday, January 3, 1932  
  Japanese forces occupied Chinchow, Liaoning Province and drove Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's forces from Manchuria. Japan took this action alleging the danger of bandits.  
  Thursday, January 7, 1932  
  U.S. Secretary of State Henry Stimson declared in notes to the Chinese and Japanese governments, as well as the other signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, that the United States would not recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about by means contrary to the Pact of Paris. This note served as an American protest against the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and became known as the Stimson Doctrine.  
  Saturday, January 9, 1932  
  The British Government refused to endorse the principle of nonrecognition of unlawful conquest enunciated by Secretary Stimson or to address a similar note to Japan. The British Foreign Office issued a statement saying: "His Majesty's Government stand by the policy of the open door for international trade in Manchuria, which was guaranteed by the Nine-Power Treaty at Washington. Since the recent events in Manchuria, the Japanese representatives at the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva stated on the 13th October that Japan was the champion in Manchuria of the principle of equal opportunity and the open door for the economic activities of all nations. Further, on the 28th December, the Japanese Prime Minister stated that Japan would adhere to the Open Door policy, and would welcome participation and cooperation in Manchurian enterprise. In view of these statements, his Majesty's Government have not considered it necessary to address any formal note to the Japanese Government on the lines of the American Government's note, but the Japanese Ambassador in London has been requested to obtain confirmation of these assurances from his Government."  
  Thursday, January 14, 1932  
  The composition of the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations to investigate the situation in Manchuria was approved. The committee would be headed by V. A. G. R. Bulwer-Lytton, the second Earl of Lytton of the United Kingdom, and included U.S. Major General Frank Ross McCoy, Dr. Heinrich Schnee of Germany, Count Aldrovandi-Marescotti of Italy, and French General Henri Claudel. The commission’s report would become known as the Lytton Report. The composition of the committee would be made on January 14, 1931. The committee would spend six weeks in Manchuria during the spring of 1932 and formally issue its report on October, 1 1932.  
    Learn more about the Lytton Report …  

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